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Abstract
Private property rights security is currently seen as central to explaining cross-country differ-
ences in economic development. Variation in private property rights security itself is perceived
to be best explained by differences in the degree to which the political system is able to con-
strain the despotic power of state executives. I reassess the existing evidence for these two
hypotheses and find that: (1) higher levels and significant changes in private property rights
security and constraints on the executive are not correlated with higher levels of income and
(changes in) growth rates; (2) the commonly used instrument for constraints on the executive
and private property rights security – the natural log of European settler mortality – is invalid
because it is associated with current levels of income besides its effect through private property
rights security and constraints on the executive; and (3) the regularly cited Korean case is in
fact evidence against these hypotheses. I provide explanations for these findings and call for a
rethinking of which type of institutions and policies are decisive for growth.
Keywords: Institutions, Private Property Rights Security, Economic Development, Con-
straints on the Executive
JEL Codes: O11, P16, P51
∗I would like to thank Ha-Joon Chang, Tanushree Goyal, Bo Rothstein, Aliandra Barlete, Floris van
Dort, Augur Pierce, Ferna´n Restrepo, Bas Monsewije, Shailaja Fennell and participants at the Cambridge
Centre of Development Studies PhD Seminar for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
1 Introduction
Average income levels in today’s richest and poorest countries differ by a factor of more
than 30. These cross-country differences in income are much larger than the differences
within countries, suggesting that any individual’s standard of living is much more strongly
determined by the randomness of one’s country of birth, rather than one’s individual talent
and dedication (Milanovic, 2013). What explains these cross-country differences, and what,
if anything, poor countries can do to catch-up, remains one of the most important questions
in economics.
Over the past 30 years the economic growth literature, following the influential work
of North (1990), has reached a widespread consensus suggesting that institutions are the
most important cause of cross-country differences in economic development. This literature
strongly emphasizes the importance of private property rights security for economic devel-
opment (see, among many others, the work of: Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001);
Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004); Clague et al. (1999); Knack and Keefer (1995)).1
When studying the causes of private property rights security the existing literature has
tended to focus on the type of political institutions that constrain what could be called
“despotic state power” (see, for example, the work of: Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
1Private property rights are rights given to private agents granting them the exclusive authority over the
use of a resource (i.e. a good or asset). This can entail the right to use the good or asset for consumption
or investment (i.e. “use rights”), the right to delegate the good or asset to another agent (i.e. “transfer
right”) and the right to contract with other parties by renting, pledging or mortgaging the good or asset
(i.e. “contract right”). Private property rights security could plausibly affect economic development through
(at least) four mechanisms. First, ill-defined and poorly protected private property rights might lower
investment because they increase the uncertainty agents face as to whether they will be able to reap the
benefits of their investment in the future. Second, insecure private property rights might divert resources
from productive purposes toward private protection which is likely to be inefficient due to a decrease in the
division of labor and due to economies of scale in securing property. Third, poorly defined private property
rights and the difficult to enforce contracts that follow from them might retard potential gains of trade in
markets were exchanges require significant and irreversible commitments in the present, whether in the form
of goods manufactured and shipped, or fixed investments made, in the expectation of payment or returns in
the future. Last, non-registered, non-recognized and poorly protected private property rights might reduce
access to financial markets because potential investors are unable to use their existing property as collateral
for future loans (which might reduce investment because it hampers the possibility for agents to use both
their past income (savings) and future income for investment) (Besley and Ghatak, 2009; Clague et al., 1999;
De Soto, 2000).
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(2001, 2005), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), North (1990), North and Weingast (1989),
Moselle and Polak (2001), Olson (1993), Grossman and Kim (1995), Besley and Ghatak
(2009), and Keefer and Knack (1997)).2 Formal checks-and-balances on despotic state power
are seen to increase the security of private property rights by limiting the ability of state
executives to use the state apparatus as a means to enrich themselves through the expro-
priation of citizens outside the political elite. Although in theory state executives could
refrain from expropriation and promise to respect the property of non-elites in the future,
in practice such commitments will not be credible in the absence of institutional guarantees
constraining their actual ability to expropriate private property (Acemoglu, Johnson and
Robinson, 2005). The expectation is that in the absence of significant formal constraints
on executive power, incentives to invest will be severely reduced given that economic agents
outside of the political elite are fundamentally uncertain if they will be able to reap the
benefits of their investments in the future (Besley and Ghatak, 2009; Acemoglu, Johnson
and Robinson, 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Easterly, 2001).
The evidence for the dual claim that private property rights security causes economic
development, and that private property rights security is in turn caused by institutions that
constrain despotic state power is derived from three sources. First, the “natural experiment”
introduced by the demarcation of Korea in the period from 1945 to 1953. While both
North and South Korea started off in 1945 with equivalent background characteristics, they
over time developed very different institutions with regard to the regulation of executive
power and the protection of private property rights. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) suggest that the difference in income levels that we
observe between North and South Korea today can be explained by post-World War II South
Korea introducing secure private property rights and significant institutional constraints
2I define despotic state power by Mann (1984, 113): “[...] the range of actions which the elite is
empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups.” Existing
studies focus, for example, on: to what extent courts function independently of the government, the extent
to which there exist regular free and fair elections, and the extent to which most (important) legislation is
produced by an independent parliament rather than by the executive branch itself.
2
on despotic state power. Second, evidence in favor of the importance of institutions that
constrain despotic state power and secure private property rights is obtained from (cross-
sectional) ordinary least square (OLS) regression models which find that countries with
more institutionally constraint political executives and more secure private property rights
are on average richer (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, 2005; Hall and Jones, 1999;
Clague et al., 1999; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Keefer and Knack, 1997), and that countries
with more constraint political executives tend to have more secure private property rights
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; La Porta et al.,
2004). Third, the existing literature derives evidence from (cross-sectional) instrumental
variable (IV) regression models that use the natural log of European settler mortality in
previously colonized countries as an instrument for differences in the security of private
property rights (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) and differences in the degree of
constraints on despotic state power (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005), and find strong effects
on current income levels.
I re-examine these three pieces of evidence and conclude that the existing literature
does not provide convincing evidence for the claim that private property rights security and
constraints on despotic state power are important causes of economic development.
First, I find that the South Korean government, throughout South Korea’s period of rapid
economic development (1963-1987), heavily violated the private property rights of many
companies across a large number of sectors, most of which then and now constitute(d) South
Korea’s most important industries. Furthermore I find that South Korea only developed
significant constraints on its executive in 1988, well after it already achieved average GDP
per capita PPP growth rates of about 7% per year in the preceding 25-year period.
Second, I find that while insecure private property rights is typically claimed to explain
the underdevelopment of currently poor countries, more secure private property rights are
only associated with higher levels of economic development within the group of countries
that have already attained a high level of income (according to the 2017 World Bank income
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classification). Even within the group of high income countries the effect of private property
rights security is small and explains little of cross-country variance in GDP per capita PPP.
With regard to the commonly used constraints on the executive variable from Polity IV
(the literature’s measure of choice for operationalizing despotic state power) I find that this
variable explains little to none of cross-country differences in economic development and/or
private property rights security. Previously found effects seem to be due to econometric
misspecification generated by using the variable as if measured on an interval/ratio rather
than on an ordinal measurement level (see appendix E for the full codebook of Polity IV’s
constraints on the executive variable).
Last, using simple OLS mediation analysis I show that the log of European settler mor-
tality is likely to be an invalid instrument for private property rights security and institu-
tions constraining despotic state power. This is because European settler mortality remains
strongly and significantly correlated with GDP per capita PPP after controlling for private
property rights security or constraints on the executive. This means that European settler
mortality is either directly related to today’s income levels or its effect on economic devel-
opment is mediated through other mechanisms besides institutions that constrain despotic
state power and provide security to private property rights. Both these possibilities would
constitute a violation of the exclusion restriction of IV regression models, which renders IV
estimates invalid.
In addition to the existing literature I also examine the time series evidence for the private
property rights and constraints on despotic state power hypotheses. I find here that levels
of constraints on the executive and private property rights security are not correlated with
subsequent growth rates, and that exceptionally large and sustained changes in the level
of constraints on the executive and private property rights security are not correlated with
subsequent changes in growth rates.
I demonstrate that these results hold across a wide range of alternative measures of private
property rights security and constraints on despotic state power. In the text I present the
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results using private property rights security as measured by the Economic Freedom Index of
the Heritage Foundation and constraint on the executive as measured by Polity IV (which are
the commonly used measures in the literature). As a robustness check I show in appendix D
that all the results with respect to private property rights security also hold for government
expropriation without adequate compensation taken from the World Justice Project, private
property rights security as measured by the Bertelmann Transformation Index (BTI), and
contract viability and risk of expropriation as measured by the International Country Risk
Guide of Political Risk Services.3 With regard to constraints on despotic state power I
show in appendix F that all results reported in the text also apply to constraints on the
government as measured by the World Justice Project and (liberal) democracy as measured
by the interpolated polity measure of Polity IV/Freedom House.4
The results are also robust to excluding the East Asian countries that all, with the possible
exception of Japan, have industrialized under authoritarian institutions that did not provide
much security to private property rights (Taiwan and South Korea), and in some cases have
still not developed such institutions (China, Singapore, and Hong Kong).5 All results also
hold when excluding large oil-producing countries that are generally characterized by insecure
private property rights and little constraints on despotic state power but have relatively high
average income levels.6 These results are available on request.
3With regard to these measures I find that more secure private property rights (as measured by BTI) and
contract viability/expropriation risk are only associated with higher levels of GDP per capita PPP among
high income countries (as classified by the World Bank). Government expropriation without adequate
compensation is not correlated with GDP per capita PPP at any income level.
4Here I find that more constraints on the government is not associated with higher income levels at any
level of development. Constraints on the government is associated with more secure private property rights
but only among middle and high income countries. Higher levels of democracy are only associated with
higher levels of economic development among high income countries. Democracy is, however, associated
with more secure private property rights at all development levels.
5Cases that I exclude in this robustness check are: Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.
GDP data for Hong Kong is unavailable so this case is omitted in the original sample as well.
6I here exclude countries that in 2013 extracted more than 20% of their GDP from the production of oil
(according to World Bank data): Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq,
Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Republic of Congo, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and
Venezuela. Two other countries also extracted more than 20% of their GDP from oil in 2013 but are (already)
excluded from the main sample due to a lack of data on private property rights security and constraints on
the executive, these are: Brunei Darussalam and South Sudan.
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The findings of this paper have substantial implications for development policy and re-
search around the world. The results suggest that introducing more institutional constraints
on despotic state power (although important for many other human ends) is unlikely to
lead to more secure private property rights and better economic outcomes. Further, more
secure private property rights in itself is unlikely to lead to better economic performance,
particularly at lower levels of development. Overall it seems fair to conclude that while
the existing literature has found innovative ways to isolate the effect of institutions from
other fundamental explanations for economic development, such as geography and culture,
it has not (yet) established convincingly which institutions and policies are most decisive for
enhancing economic growth in poor countries.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. First, I describe in more detail the existing
evidence with regard to the causes and effects of private property rights security. Second,
I reassess the Korean experience after World War II. Third, I reassess the existing OLS
evidence regarding the relationships between constraints on despotic state power, private
property rights security, and economic development. Fourth, I study the validity of the
European settler mortality instrument. Fifth, I assess the relationship between constraints
on despotic state power, private property rights security, and economic development over
time. Last, I conclude by summarizing the main results and by drawing implications for
future research.
2 The Existing Evidence on the Causes and Effects of
Private Property Rights Security
Studying the causes and effects of private property rights security naturally suffers from the
fundamental problem that researchers cannot randomly assign differences in private property
rights security and/or differences in the degree to which the state executive is institutionally
constraint across countries. The existing literature has therefore relied on three alternative
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identification strategies.
First, the literature has focused on the “natural experimental” experience of Korea after
World War II.7 Before the separation of Korea in 1945 North and South Korea were both
part of the same country and shared the same history, geography, culture and economic
development levels. Following the demarcation both countries introduced very different types
of institutions. South Korea became a democracy with significant constraints despotic state
power, and institutions that protect private investors from arbitrary confiscation by the state.
North Korea, in contrast, became a notorious dictatorship with little to no constraints on
executive power and virtually no private property rights at all (since most land and assets are
owned by the state). Given that South Korea, with a GDP per capita PPP of approximately
$35.000, is now more than 19 times richer North Korea (which has an estimated GDP per
capita of $1800) Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson
(2005) take the Korean case as evidence for the large and causal effect of (the type of)
institutions that constrain despotic state power and provide security to private property
rights.
Second, a large body of relatively dated but still widely cited studies use (cross-sectional)
OLS regression models to document a strong positive association between private property
rights security (typically measured by citizen and/or expert surveys) and investment, growth
rates and GDP per capita PPP levels (see, among others: Hall and Jones (1999), Clague
et al. (1999), Knack and Keefer (1995), Keefer and Knack (1997)). Constraints on despotic
state power is predominantly measured by the “constraints on the executive” variable of the
Polity IV project, and is found, among others, by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson (2001) and Keefer and Knack (1997) to be significantly related to
7The term “natural experimental” is somewhat misleading in this context because the treatment, dif-
ferences in private property rights security and despotic state power, is in the case of Korea not assigned
by researchers themselves (making the design strictly speaking “observational” rather than “experimental”),
and the treatment is also not assigned randomly. In addition, the process through which the treatment was
assigned in the Korean case was not “natural”, in the sense of exogenous to human agency, but was rather
a result of a political process that assigned different type of institutions to both countries over time.
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private property rights security, investment and GDP per capita.8
Last, evidence for the importance for economic development of institutions that constrain
despotic state power and secure private property rights is derived from (cross-sectional) IV
regression models. Given that OLS estimates are likely to be biased due to omitted variable
bias and/or reversed causality, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) (henceforward AJR,
2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have attempted to instrument for private property
rights security and institutions constraining despotic state power using variation in 17th to
19th century European settler mortality rates in previously colonized countries.
AJR (2001) claim that: (1) European governments introduced very different types of
institutions in different colonies. In some countries, Europeans set up political institutions
geared to the extraction of natural resources and the exploitation of labor which naturally did
not limit the despotic power of political executives and therefore rendered private property
rights insecure (such as in: the Congo, India, and Namibia). In other colonies they set up
institutions like those in Western Europe, which did constrain despotic state power and did
provide security to private property rights (such as in: the United States, Australia, and
Canada); (2) these different colonization strategies were partly influenced by the feasibility
of European settlement. In regions where the disease environment was hostile to European
survival, Europeans chose not to settle and subsequently introduced “bad” political and
economic institutions. In places where they could survive European settlers demanded to
live under institutions similar to those in Western Europe, thereby importing into these
8Democracy is in some studies hypothesized to affect economic development through, among many other
things, private property rights security (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). Regular and competitive elections
are seen as a constrain on expropriatory behavior of state elites, and institutional guarantees for individual
and political rights are seen to enhance the power of civil society to organize against despotic state behavior.
Leaders in autocratic regimes are claimed to have no way to make a credible commitment to private property
rights because there is no one who can force them to keep their commitments (Olson, 1993). Other widely
studied institutional explanations for economic development are also sometimes theorized to affect economic
development through private property rights security. Corruption is, for example, claimed to affect private
property rights security, particularly when the judiciary oversight over bureaucrats is poorly institutionalized
(Keefer and Knack, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999). Other studies focus on the effect of political instability such
as coups, revolutions and political assassinations (Mauro, 1995; Barro, 1991). The focus in this literature
is generally on the (expected) length of a ruler’s tenure. The logic is that leaders who fear replacement are
more likely to expropriate because they expect to bear fewer of the future costs of their current expropriatory
actions (Clague et al., 1999; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Olson, 1993).
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countries institutions that protect citizens from abuse of power by the executive and secure
private property rights; and (3) these differences in institutions, partly caused by European
colonial policy as a function of disease environments, persist until today.
AJR (2001) find a strong relationship between European settler mortality rates in the 17th
to 19th century and GDP per capita PPP in 1995 and imply (by their empirical strategy) that
the only way to explain this finding is through the varying degrees of checks-and-balances
and private property rights security introduced by institutions set up by European colonizers.
While AJR (2001) use the average risk of expropriation of foreign-owned assets between
1985 and 1995 (from the International Country Risk Guide database) as their measure of
(general) private property rights security, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) show that Polity
IV’s constraints on the executive variable can also be instrumented by 17th to 19th century
European settler mortality rates.9
3 Reassessing the Korean Natural Experiment.
The Korean case is certainly insightful when thinking about economic growth because it high-
lights the importance of institutions and policies as opposed to other commonly expressed
explanations for cross-country differences in economic development, such as: geography, cli-
mate and cultural values related to work (which arguably are, or at least were before South
Korea’s development took off, equivalent across the two countries).
I argue, however, that the Korean experience cannot be interpreted as evidence for the
type of institutions and policies that constrain despotic state power and provide security
to private property rights. This is so because: (1) the South Korean government during
its country’s growth miracle, the 25-years from 1963 to 1987, actively and openly violated
the private property rights of many enterprises across a wide range of different sectors.10
9Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) replicated AJR’s (2001) analysis using the rule of law index
from the World Governance Indicators dataset and confirmed their conclusions. This variable arguably
suffers from low measurement validity, however, given that the index includes many different variables that
do not clearly measure the same underlying concept.
10During this period South Korea’s GDP per capita PPP expanded on average with 6.88% per year (as
9
Importantly, the corporations with the most insecure property rights throughout this period,
the so-called “priority sectors”, which were regularly subject to forced mergers, arbitrary rule
changes, confiscatory taxation and deprivation of credit by the nationalized banking sector,
were at the centre of South Korea’s industrialization and still form the major industries in
South Korea today (this includes the electronics-, shipbuilding-, automotive-, petrochemical-
and steel industries); and (2) South Korea only developed substantial institutional constrains
on its executive subsequent to the legislative election of 26 April 1988, well after it developed
economically in the preceding two and a half decades.
3.1 Private Property Rights Security in South Korea
While it is true that North and South Korea did start from similar income levels (North
Korea was in fact a bit richer and more industrialized initially in 1945), and obviously share
the same cultural heritage and geography, it is not true that the only things that have come
to vary between the two current countries since 1945 are: (1) economic growth rates; (2)
the level of private property rights security; and (3) the level of institutional constraints
on despotic state power. In fact many variables have changed drastically between the two
places over time, several of which could also explain the stark difference in outcome. This
includes the international environment (North-Korea being aligned with the Soviet Union
and China, South-Korea being supported by the U.S. and Japan) and the policies they
implemented after 1953 (South Korea, after the take-over of power by general Park Chung-
Hee in 1961, focused on export-oriented industrialization, while North-Korea focused on
autarky and military-development based on the philosophy of Juche and Songun).
More importantly, however, the South Korean government throughout South Korea’s
period of rapid economic development repeatedly and openly violated the property rights
of many key companies. One of the first political-economic moves of the Park government,
compared to 1.27% in the period from 1953 to 1962). After 1987 South Korea’s growth rate decreased
significantly but still remained unusually high by international standards (5.96% per year) until 2002. From
2003 to 2011 South Korea grew on average 3.26% per year (author’s own calculation based on Penn World
Tables GDP data).
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which came to power via a military coup in 1961, was to fully nationalize the South Korean
banking sector.11 The Park government used the nationalized banking system to direct in-
vestments and to force the behavior of “priority sectors” in line with government five-year
plans (FYP). Most of Korea’s current major industries have been designated as “priority sec-
tors” in FYP’s at some stage during 1963-1991.12 Enterprises in these sectors were subject
to massive state control over the use and development of technology, lost the autonomy to
set their own prices, and were subject to detailed state planning with regard to investment.
Violators of such restrictions were punished with the revocation of licenses, withdrawal of
credit contracts, identification and heavy punishment of tax law violations previously left un-
scrutinized, fines, implicit threats of withdrawal or actual withholding of previously attained
privileges, expropriation, forced merger with other companies, and in extreme cases prison
sentences (Chang, 1996; Jones and Sakong, 1980; Leipziger, 1988). Promoted industries
were subject to regular review of investment decisions and were required to report monthly
not just their export performance but all information regarding their business decisions and
performance (Jones and Sakong, 1980).
The South Korean government reserved significant bureaucratic discretion with regard to
the implementation and enforcement of the existing rules, creating a constant insecurity for
enterprises with regard to their market- and capital positions. The eligibility criteria were
deliberately made vague enough for any industry to qualify and rules were regularly enforced
or left unenforced for political reasons (Chang, 1996). Jones and Sakong (1980) literally call
the political situation in South Korea from 1961 to 1980 the rule of man rather than the
11To highlight the importance of this Jones and Sakong (1980, 110) note that: “In Korea, the chaebol
groups are young, rapidly growing, and heavily leveraged so credit is not only for expansion but for survival.”
and that “The knowledge that the government can cut off the credit tap at anytime is sufficient for the
operation of partial mutuality. The threat need only be carried out occasionally. Recognizing the importance
of this mechanism is central to understanding how business-government relations work in Korea.” (p. 109)
12The First FYP (1962-6) designated cement, fertiliser, and oil refining as “basic” industries. Chemicals,
steel and machinery were priority sectors in the Second FYP (1967-71). During the Third and Fourth FYP
periods (1972-81), especially through the Heavy-Chemical Industry Drive (HCI) programme (announced
in 1973), non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding and electronics were added to the Second FYP’s list of priority
sectors. The practice continued in the Fifth and Sixth FYP periods (1982-91), during which machinery, elec-
tronics, automobile, chemical, shipbuilding and various high-tech industries (semiconductor, new materials,
biotechnology) were categorized as priority sectors (Chang, 1996).
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rule of law and provide an illustrative example with regard to tax enforcement:
“Suppose the government has made a company aware of its patriotic duty to
contribute a little extra to national defense in a time of national crisis. Suppose
further that the company ignores its duty. It is then imaginable that the company
may appear on the select list of those to be investigated. Good and sufficient
grounds will undoubtedly be found for penalizing the firm for non-compliance
with non-discretionary tax laws, but the managers will be excused for believing
that they are really being penalized for ignoring a command. More important,
other owners may have their patriotic conscience raised by the example.” (Jones
and Sakong, 1980, 115)
Besides strongly influencing the allocation of resources through its full control over the
banking sector and near to full control over the behavior of individual private enterprises,
the South Korean state itself owned various strategic industries, including: oil-refining, coal
(partly), gas, electricity, fertilizer and steel (Chang, 1996). Jones and Sakong (1980, 297)
note with regard to public ownership during South Korea’s growth miracle that: “[...] despite
a rhetorical commitment to private enterprise, public ownership has been used to an extent
that parallels that of many countries advocating a socialist pattern of society.”
3.2 Despotic State Power in South Korea
Taken together it seems hard to argue that private property rights were particularly secure
during South Korea’s period of rapid industrialization. Perhaps even more important, how-
ever, South Korea industrialized well before it institutionalized substantial constraints on
despotic state power.13 Before 1988 South Korea had levels of constraints on despotic state
power that were similar (and sometimes lower) than North Korea (see figure 1). Although
the absence of an effective legislative and judiciary body in South Korea during its growth
13Note that this has been pointed out before by Glaeser et al. (2004).
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Figure 1: Constraints on despotic state power in North and South Korea from 1950 to 2010.
Notes: Constraints on the executive as measured by Polity IV (ranging from 1-7, 7 being most
constraint).
miracle period (1963-1987) has been pointed out on numerous occasions and is uncontro-
versial among historians specialized in South Korea (such as: Seth (2016), Pratt (2007),
Peterson (2009)) I provide a short summary of South Korea’s political history from 1961 to
1996 in appendix A. This qualitative-historical evidence is in line with the levels and trends
displayed in figure 1.
Based on the previous section, figure 1, and appendix A I conclude that South Korea
developed under a highly authoritarian state that had little to no respect for private property
rights. This does not mean that South Korea necessarily developed because it had such
an unconstraint executive which violated private property rights on a large scale, or that
13
other countries should try to develop their economy through such measures. It does mean,
however, that the South Korean case cannot be seen as providing evidence for (and is in
fact important evidence against) the claim that the institutions that constrain despotic state
power and provide security to private property rights are necessary ingredients for economic
development. This is in contrast to what the current literature suggests.14
4 Reassessing the OLS evidence
Naturally little can be said about the economic effect of institutions that constrain despotic
state power and provide security to private property rights on the basis of the case of South
Korea alone. Therefore I follow the existing literature by studying the simple OLS rela-
tionship between constraints on despotic state power, private property rights security, and
economic development in a large cross-section of countries.15
If it is true that private property rights security is an important cause of economic
development and that private property rights security is in turn determined by the extent to
which a country’s institutions constrain the despotic power of its state executive we would
expect to find the following correlations: (1) countries with more secure private property
rights are richer; (2) countries with more constraint executives are richer; and (3) countries
with more constraint executives have more secure private property rights.
In sharp contrast, I find that: (1) more secure private property rights is only associated
with higher levels of GDP per capita PPP among high income countries; (2) Polity IV’s
constraints on the executive variable is not associated with GDP per capita PPP when used
on its proper, ordinal, measurement level. When excluding the effect of category 7 (on a
scale from 1 to 7, 7 being most constraint) its effect on income is in fact negative; and (3)
only category 7 of Polity IV’s constraints on the executive variable is significantly associated
14The form and implementation of South Korean industrial policy, rather than the institutions related to
executive power and private property rights, are seen by many South Korea specialists as the prime reason
for its rapid development (Amsden, 1989; Chang, 1996, 1993; Wade, 1990).
15I study all countries for which data is available.
14
with more secure private property rights.
In the following section I shortly discuss the data which I use to measure economic
development, constraints on despotic state power, and private property rights security. Sub-
sequently I examine each association individually.
4.1 Data
All the data that I use can be considered standard in the existing literature; which typically
measures economic development through GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP),
private property rights through the use of citizen/expert survey data, and constraints on
despotic state power through the expert coding of the Polity IV project.16
For GDP per capita PPP data I rely on the World Bank Development Indicators database.
The data refer to the year 2013.17 In appendix C I replicate all results with Penn World
Tables’ real GDP per capita data from 2011, and find identical results.18 All independent
variables are always measured in the same year as the GDP data.
There are several datasets available for the measurement of private property rights secu-
rity. In the main text I report the results when private property rights is measured by data
from the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. The variable combines (existing)
survey data on physical property rights, intellectual property rights, strength of investor pro-
tection, risk of expropriation, and the quality of land administration. It accounts for both
the possibility that private property is expropriated by the state, and that private property
rights are violated by other citizens.19 It also incorporates the degree to which the judiciary
functions independently from the executive, the degree of corruption within the judiciary,
and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts. The variable ranges from
16See appendix B for the descriptive statistics of all data used.
17These data are in constant 2011 international dollars.
18These data are in constant 2005 US dollars.
19I choose to take this comprehensive measure of private property rights security rather than one focused
only on government expropriations (as, for example, AJR (2001)) because there is no theoretical reason
to expect that state violations of private property rights are more or less detrimental for an individuals’
incentive to invest than such violations by non-state actors.
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0 to 10, higher scores meaning more secure private property rights. As a robustness check
I replicate my results with three other commonly used measures of private property rights
security: government expropriation without adequate compensation from the World Justice
Project, private property rights security as measured by the Bertelmann Transformation In-
dex (BTI), and contract viability and risk of expropriation as measured by the International
Country Risk Guide of Political Risk Services. These exercises yield similar results as those
reported below (see appendix D).
I measure constraints on despotic state power by Polity IV’s “constraints on the execu-
tive” variable. This variable measures, on a scale from 1 to 7 (7 meaning most constraints),
to what extent there exist regular limitations on the executive’s actions exercised by (an)
independent accountability group(s). These accountability groups can be independent legis-
latures or judiciaries, but can also be a ruling political party that has gained power through
regular free and competitive elections and has effective authority over the selection and
behavior of the state executive. This measure is the most commonly used variable in the
existing literature and is specifically mentioned by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) as the best
measure available for measuring constraints on despotic state power. As a robustness check
I replicate my results with two alternative measures of institutions constraining despotic
state power: constraints on the government as measured by the World Justice Project and
(liberal) democracy as measured by the interpolated polity measure of Polity IV/Freedom
House. These exercises yield similar results as those reported below (see appendix F).
4.2 Private Property Rights Security and Economic Development
I study the relationship between the security of private property rights and economic devel-
opment by estimating (cross-sectional) OLS regression models of the form:
ln(Y )i = β0 + β1Mi + i (1)
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Where ln(Y) is the natural log of GDP per capita PPP in the year 2013, in country i. M is
private property rights security as measured by the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic
Freedom, in country i. And  is a standard error term which is assumed to be independently
distributed from all regressors with a mean of 0. I study the association between private
property rights security and GDP per capita PPP in the full sample of 170 countries for
which data is available, and when restricting the sample to only low, middle, and high
income countries.20
Column (1) in table 1 shows that private property rights security is indeed positively
associated with income levels, at least among the 170 countries included in this sample. The
model predicts that a one standard deviation (or, a 2.4 scale point) increase in the security
of private property rights (measured on a scale from 0 to 10, 10 being most secure) will lead,
on average, to a 0.801 increase in the natural log of GDP per capita PPP. According to this
bivariate specification differences in the level of private property rights security alone are
able to account for 43.2% of all differences in income levels across countries.
Importantly, however, column (2) and (3) in table 1 show that more secure private
property rights are not associated with higher levels of income within the group of low and
middle income countries (although the effect remains weakly positive). Among the 121 low
and middle income countries included in the sample the effect of private property right
security on GDP per capita PPP falls with more than a factor 4, is statistically insignificant
at the 5% confidence level and explains less than 2% of all differences in income levels.
Even among the 49 high income countries included in table 1 the effect of private property
20These income groups are coded on the basis of the position of each coun-
try in the 2017 World Bank income group classifications, which are available at:
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519. I have merged the lower and
higher middle income countries into one category. This provides me with three categories: (1) low income
countries defined as having a 2017 GNI per capita of $1,025 or less (N = 30); (2) middle income countries
defined as having a 2017 GNI per capita of between $1,026 and $12,475 (N = 108); and (3) high income
countries defined as having a 2017 GNI per capita of more than $12,475 (N = 79). Note that, as could
be expected given these wide ranges, there still exists significant variation in GDP per capita PPP within
these three groups (the standard deviation of the log of my GDP per capita PPP data is 0.407 in the low
income group, 0.714 in the middle income group, and 0.515 among high income countries. These standard
deviations in absolute terms amount to $460, $5,188, and $20,526 respectively).
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Table 1: Income levels regressed on private property rights security.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Property rights 0.801*** 0.112 0.174 0.183*
(0.0617) (0.233) (0.101) (0.077)
Constant 9.276*** 7.291*** 9.078*** 10.298***
(0.0648) (0.212) (0.075) (0.105)
Observations 170 26 95 49
Adjusted R-squared 0.432 -0.029 0.016 0.074
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is log GDP per capita (PPP basis)
in 2013, measured in constant 2011 international dollars (from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators). Property rights is private property rights security (standardized) as measured by the Heritage
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (higher scores mean more secure private property rights). Income
group classifications are based on the 2017 World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
rights security on GDP per capita PPP decreases with more than 0.600 scale points, is only
statistically significant at the 5% confidence level, and explains less than 7.5% of differences
in income levels.
These results suggest that the estimate in column (1) of table 1 is (for a large part)
invalid due to omitted variable bias; high income countries differ from developing countries
on many other characteristics besides the security of private property rights, at least some
of which appear to be correlated with both the security of private property rights and GDP
per capita PPP, thereby leading to an overestimation of the independent effect of private
property rights security.
The important conclusion to draw from this finding is that the security of private prop-
erty rights security is, at best, a good explanation for differences in economic development
between already rich countries (although the results in table 1 do, of course, only establish
correlation, not causation), and that private property rights security is not a strong explana-
tion for economic underdevelopment. In the absence of a strong and statistically significant
correlation between more secure private property rights and higher levels of GDP per capita
PPP among low and middle income countries, it seems highly unlikely that introducing more
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secure private property rights on lower stages of economic development will lead to better
economic performance.
4.3 Despotic State Power and Economic Development
To study the relationship between institutions that constrain despotic state power and eco-
nomic development I run OLS regressions of the form:
ln(Y )i = β0 + β1Xi + i (2)
Whereby ln(Y) is the natural log of GDP per capita PPP in 2013, in country i. And X is
constraints on the executive as measured by Polity IV, in country i.
Table 2 reports the results. Column (1) indicates that constraints on the executive is
indeed positively related to income levels if we treat it as an interval variable (as in: AJR
(2001), Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) and Knack and Keefer (1997)). In that specification
a one standard deviation (or, a 1.9 scale point) increase in constraints on the executive
(measured on a scale from 1 to 7, higher scores meaning more constraints on the executive)
leads, on average, to a 0.277 increase in the log of GDP per capita PPP. The model estimates
that differences in the extent to which the executive is institutionally constraint are able to
account for approximately 2.5% of all differences in income levels among the 150 countries
included in the sample.
It is important to realize, however, that Polity IV’s constraints on the executive variable is
not measured on an interval level (see appendix E for the full codebook). It consists instead
of four substantive categories (1, 3, 5, and 7) and three so-called “intermediate” categories.
Considering its coding it cannot be assumed that the distances between each category are
equal, which adding them to the equation as an interval variable would imply. Using all seven
categories as dummies (i.e. using the “intermediate” categories as independent categories)
also raises problems since some categories have very few observations (category 1 has, for
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Table 2: Income levels regressed on constraints on the executive.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Full Full Low income Middle income High income
Constraints on executive (1-7) 0.277*
(0.139)
Constraints on executive = 3-4 -0.576 -0.178 -0.041 0.218
(0.382) (0.117) (0.282) (0.267)
Constraints on executive = 5-6 -0.920** -0.372* -0.277 -0.492
(0.324) (0.156) (0.248) (0.265)
Constraints on executive = 7 0.393 -0.267** -0.233 -0.524
(0.308) (0.089) (0.267) (0.268)
Constant 8.999*** 9.396*** 7.488*** 9.195*** 10.953***
(0.145) (0.282) (0.089) (0.220) (0.261)
Observations 150 150 24 82 44
Adjusted R-squared 0.025 0.204 -0.017 -0.010 0.255
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent
variable in all regressions is log GDP per capita (PPP basis) in 2013, measured in constant 2011 in-
ternational dollars (from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators). Constraints on executive
is constraints on the executive as measured by Polity IV (higher scores mean more constraints on the
executive). Constraints on executive (1-7) is standardized. Reference category in column (2) – (5) are
categories 1 and 2 of the original constraints on the executive variable. Income group classifications are
based on the 2017 World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
example, only 7 observations, category 4 has only 10) so that regression coefficients are likely
to be overly sensitive to outliers.
Column (2) in table 2 therefore adds the variable transformed into four groups (each
“intermediate” category is included with the category preceding it, category 7 – being the
largest – is used as an individual category of 61 observations). In the models the lowest two
categories of the original variable are used as the reference group. The results of this exercise
show that all of the effect of column (1) is driven by the top category 7 (i.e. the countries
with the most constraint executives). In contrast to what the constraints on despotic state
power hypothesis would predict countries in categories 3 and 4, and countries in categories
5 and 6 are poorer than countries in the lowest two categories (i.e. the countries with the
least constraint executives).
Even the positive effect of category 7 changes sign and becomes negative when studying
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the effect only among countries at similar development levels (columns (3) to (5)). The
results suggest therefore that category 7 in column (2) is simply functioning as a proxy for
unobserved omitted variables which vary between income groups (held constant in column
(3) to (5)) and that constraints on the executive does not have much effect on its own. If it
does have an effect at all it is likely to be a negative effect given that countries in categories
3 and 4, 5 and 6, and countries in category 7 are generally poorer than countries with less
constraint executives. The important conclusion to draw from this finding is that introducing
more constraints on despotic state power is unlikely to lead to better economic performance.
4.4 Despotic State Power and Private Property Rights Security
To see to what extent countries with institutions that put more limits on despotic state
power have more secure private property rights I estimate the following equation using OLS:
Mi = β0 + β1Xi + i (3)
Whereby M is the level of private property rights security, in country i. And X is the level
of constraints on the executive, in country i.
The results are reported in table 3. Similar to the results in table 2, Polity IV’s constraints
on the executive variable is positively correlated with private property rights security when
used (incorrectly) as an interval variable (column (1)), but when used on its proper, ordinal,
measurement level it becomes clear that all of this significant positive effect is driven by
the top category 7. Countries in categories 3 and 4, and countries in categories 5 and 6
do not have significantly more secure private property rights as compared to countries in
categories 1 and 2 (although the effect is, in line with the existing literature, positive).
Among low income countries more constraints on the despotic power of state executives is
not significantly associated with more secure private property rights. Within middle and
high income countries, only countries in the top 3 categories of the original constraints on
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Table 3: Private property rights security regressed on constraints on the executive.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Full Full Low income Middle income High income
Constraints on executive (1-7) 0.620***
(0.092)
Constraints on executive = 3-4 0.112 0.313 0.161 0.470
(0.212) (0.226) (0.192) (0.508)
Constraints on executive = 5-6 0.251 0.289 0.519*** 0.887**
(0.179) (0.253) (0.146) (0.283)
Constraints on executive = 7 1.377*** 0.417 0.787*** 0.887**
(0.200) (0.215) (0.173) (0.265)
Constant -0.579*** -0.845*** -1.158*** -1.110*** 0.251
(0.080) (0.155) (0.215) (0.117) (0.237)
Observations 155 155 25 85 45
Adjusted R-squared 0.238 0.347 -0.057 0.191 0.077
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent
variable in all regressions is private property rights security (standardized) as measured by the Heritage
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom (higher scores mean more secure private property rights). Con-
straints on executive is constraints on the executive as measured by Polity IV (higher scores mean more
constraints on the executive). Constraints (1-7) is standardized. Reference category in column (2) – (5)
are categories 1 and 2 of the original constraints on the executive variable. Income group classifications
are based on the 2017 World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
the executive variable do have significantly more secure private property rights as compared
to countries in the lowest two categories.
Taken together the results suggest that more constraints on despotic state power do not in
general lead to more secure private property rights. Among middle and high income countries
there could be a threshold effect (although one cannot say this with much certainty based
on these bivariate associations alone), whereby private property rights are not significantly
more secure when introducing a few extra institutional constraints on a (still) generally
unconstraint executive, but private property rights security do become significantly more
secure once political systems manage to introduce institutions that more severely constrain
despotic state power.
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5 Reassessing the IV evidence
AJR (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) were well-aware of the risk of endogeneity
introduced by omitted variable bias (i.e. variables that are both associated with constraints
on the executive/private property right security and economic development) and/or reversed
causality (i.e. economic development leading to more constraints on the executive/more se-
cure private property rights, rather than visa versa) in studying the OLS relationship between
institutions that constrain despotic state power and provide security to private property
rights and economic development. For the same reasons that rejections of nul-hypotheses
based on OLS models with endogenous regressors might be invalid, also acceptances of null-
hypotheses (as in the three sections above) might suffer from the same problem.21
In an effort to overcome these problems AJR (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005)
use European settler mortality from the 17th to 19th century as an instrument for institu-
tions that constrain despotic state power and provide security to private property rights.
The validity of their approach is contingent upon three conditions: (1) European settler
mortality is not itself determined by GDP per capita PPP; (2) European settler mortality
is not simultaneously determined with GDP per capita PPP by an unobserved confounding
variable; and (3) European settler mortality is only related to currents levels of GDP per
capita PPP through its effect on constraints on despotic state power/private property rights
security (i.e. the “exclusion restriction”).
Although the validity of an instrument can never be fully assessed on the basis of data
(given that conditions (1) and (2) have to assumed) one can, at least to some extent, study
empirically whether the effect of European settler mortality is only associated with current
21In fact, endogeneity might be so large as to change the direction of regression coefficients completely.
It is theoretically possible, for example, that the lack of correlation between constraints on the executive,
private property rights security, and GDP per capita PPP is due to an unobserved suppressing variable,
which when properly accounted for would leave a positive effect between institutions that constrain despotic
state power, institutions that provide security to private property rights, and economic development. It is
also possible that the hypothesized associations exist and are causal in the real world, but that these effects
are not observed in statistical models because the regressors’ coefficients are biased down due to (random)
measurement error in Polity IV’s constraints on the executive and Heritage Foundation’s private property
rights security variables (i.e. attenuation bias).
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income levels through its effect on institutions that constrain despotic state power and se-
cure private property rights. This is of interest here because it is not obvious that European
settler mortality, and the settlement decisions that were partly determined by it, has af-
fected differences in economic development today through (only) the type of institutions
that constrain despotic state power and provide security to private property rights.
European settler colonies might, precisely because Europeans were given the disease en-
vironment able to settle there, differ from non-settler colonies on many institutional factors
besides the type of institutions that constrain despotic state power and secure private prop-
erty rights. Settler colonies like the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand
have, for example, also developed institutions that generate more state capacity (i.e. the
capacity to effectively implement and enforce state policies), as compared to the institutions
that many non-settler colonies inherited from the Europeans. State capacity is in itself an
important determinant of economic development, and is also strongly associated with pri-
vate property rights security (van Noort, 2017). The lack of controls for state capacity could
therefore cause both a violation of the exclusion restriction and explain the omitted variable
bias suggested by the results discussed above.
Variables causing a violation of the exclusion restriction could also be non-institutional
in nature. Europeans who came to settle in the colonies of the New World might, for ex-
ample, have brought not so much their institutions but their own human capital, which
in itself could be an important determinant of ex-post economic outcomes. Glaeser et al.
(2004) show in line with this argument that European settler mortality correlates even more
strongly with human capital today and in 1900, as compared to current and historic levels
of constraints on the executive, and that human capital performs better in instrumental
variable regressions predicting economic growth than constraints on the executive does.22
22Droller (Forthcoming) studies variation in economic development within Argentina and demonstrates,
while holding the effect of (national) political institutions and geography constant, that area’s with a larger
inflow of European settlers during the Age of Mass Migration (1850-1914) have higher levels of GDP and
literacy rates today, and that high-skilled Europeans themselves played an important role in the onset of
industrialization; owning most of the industrial establishments, and providing the majority of industrial
labour. Easterly and Levine (2016) find, across countries, that possible adverse effects of extractive institu-
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Non-settler colonies also typically gained independence, and therefore sovereignty over trade
policies, much later than settler colonies did (although several Latin American settler colonies
were forced to sign “unequal trade treaties” after formal independence in the beginning of
the 19th century). Being a colony typically forced these countries into importing high-value
manufactured products from Western Europe while exporting relatively low-value raw mate-
rials and agricultural products – a pattern which could have affected current levels of income,
independent of institutions, through reduced historic opportunities for industrialization and
path-dependent specialization into sectors with little room for productivity growth over time
(Chang, 2007).
If any of these scenarios is a valid description of the European colonial era this would
mean that European settler mortality is an invalid instrument for the type of institutions
that constrain despotic state power and provide security to private property rights because
the instrument would be related to current levels of income through channels other than its
(possible) effect through despotic state power and private property rights institutions.
I now test directly whether European settler mortality is only related to current levels
of GDP per capita PPP through its effect on institutions that constrain despotic state
power and provide security to private property rights. I do this by estimating the following
equations (separately) using OLS:
ln(Y )i = β0 + β1ln(Z)i + β2Mi + i (4)
ln(Y )i = β0 + β1ln(Z)i + β2Xi + i (5)
If it is true that (the natural log) of European settler mortality (ln(Z)) is not itself caused
by institutions that constrain despotic state power and provide security to private property
rights, and is associated with current levels of income only through its effect on private prop-
erty rights security, we would expect β1 in equation (4) to be insignificant with a coefficient
tions associated with small European settlements were even at low levels of European settlement offset by
other things that European brought, such as human capital and technology.
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close to zero after controlling for private property rights security (M ). Similarly, if (the log
of) European setter mortality is associated with current levels of income only through its
effect on institutions that constrain despotic state power (which in turn have affected pri-
vate property rights security) we would expect β1 in equation (5) to be insignificant with a
coefficient close to zero after controlling for constraints on the executive (X ).23
The results in table 4 show that β1 is in none of the cases close to zero and statistically
insignificant. The instrument’s coefficient, after controlling for constraints on the executive
and private property rights security, remains strongly negative at -0.468 in the case of private
property rights security, and -0.682 in the case of constraints on the executive, and is always
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. This suggests that European settler
mortality is not only associated with today’s cross-country differences in GDP per capita
PPP through its effect on the type of institutions that constrain despotic state power and
provide security to private property rights.
On the econometric level it is possible, however, that some of European settler mortal-
ity’s effect on economic development is not reduced after including controls for institutions
that constrain despotic state power and provide security to private property rights, because
these institutions are likely to be measured with error. It is difficult to test this possibil-
ity empirically in the absence of more precise measures of despotic state power and private
property rights security. I am able, however, to provide an estimate of how large such mea-
surement error should be in order to account for the full effect of European settler mortality
on GDP per capita PPP. In the case of private property rights security such measurement
error should account for more than 59% of the bivariate effect of European settler mortality
on GDP per capita PPP. For the more fundamental institutions that are seen to cause higher
levels of economic development through providing more secure private property rights, the
checks-and-balances that constrain despotic state power, this measurement error should even
23Note that I do not control for M in equation (5), so that if in that specification β1 is close to zero and
insignificant, this cannot reflect a part of private property rights security that is not caused by constraints
on despotic state power but is associated with historic levels of European settler mortality and economic
development today.
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Table 4: GDP per capita PPP regressed on European settler mortality while controlling for
constraints on the executive and private property rights security.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log European settler mortality-0.794*** -0.468*** -0.549*** -0.682*** -0.694*** -0.580***
(0.093) (0.104) (0.147) (0.102) (0.107) (0.161)
Property rights 0.597*** 0.182
(0.109) (0.156)
Equality of opportunity 0.573*** 0.537**
(0.152) (0.183)
Prop X Equality 0.064
(0.121)
Constraints on executive = 3-4 0.036
(0.290)
Constraints on executive = 5-6 0.214
(0.252)
Constraints on executive = 7 0.636*
(0.286)
Constraints on executive (1-7) 0.345* 0.092
(0.158) (0.156)
Constraints X Equality 0.103
(0.165)
Constant 8.753*** 8.971*** 8.840*** 8.516*** 8.581*** 8.754***
(0.097) (0.079) (0.127) (0.197) (0.135) (0.150)
Proportion mediated – 0.410 0.309 0.141 0.126 0.270
Observations 82 81 63 74 74 60
Adjusted R-squared 0.453 0.603 0.603 0.474 0.492 0.585
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent
variable in all regressions is log GDP per capita (PPP basis) in 2013, measured in constant 2011 interna-
tional dollars (from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators). Log European settler mortality
is the natural log of European settler mortality (standardized) as in AJR (2001). Property rights is
private property rights security (standardized) as measured by the Heritage Foundation Index of Eco-
nomic Freedom (higher scores mean more secure private property rights). Constraints on executive is
constraints on the executive as measured by Polity IV (higher scores mean more constraints on the ex-
ecutive). Constraints (1-7) is standardized. Reference category in column (4) are categories 1 and 2 of
the original constraints on the executive variable. Equality of opportunity (standardized) as measured
by the Bertelmann Transformation Index (higher scores mean more equality of opportunity).
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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account for more than 85% of European settler mortality’s independent effect on economic
development (see proportion mediated in table 4). I regard it as highly unlikely that con-
straints on despotic state power and private property rights security are measured with such
high degree of error, so that in the real world European setter mortality has only affected
current economic outcomes through these type of institutions, while we are unable to observe
this statistically.
AJR (2001, 2005) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue, however, that their theory
does not only refer to the protection of private property rights but rather to a “cluster of
good institutions”, including, besides institutions that constrain despotic state power and
provide security to private property rights, institutions that ensure equal opportunity for all
citizens. Although they do not incorporate equality of opportunity in their empirical analysis
the idea is here that constraints on the executive and private property rights security only
have their large positive effects on economic development if they are accompanied with
institutions ensuring equal opportunity for a large cross-section of the society. Model (3)
and (6) in table 4 therefore add a measure of equality of opportunity interacted with private
property rights security or constraints on the executive to the model. This variable is taken
from the Bertelmann Transformation Index and asks survey respondents to rank the degree
of equality of opportunity in their country on a scale from 1 to 10. The results remain
unchanged; European settler mortality’s negative effect on today’s income levels remains
strong and highly statistically significant (this is also the case when equality of opportunity
is included without an interaction term).
Overall, considering both the historical and statistical evidence, the results strongly sug-
gest that the effect of European settler mortality is mediated not only through institutions
that constrain despotic state power and provide security for private property rights, but also
through other institutional and/or non-institutional factors. This means that AJR’s (2001)
instrument cannot be used to obtain a valid estimate of the causal effect of these type of
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institutions on GDP per capita PPP.24 At the minimum, based on the existing evidence,
it seems fair to say that one cannot conclude that the institution(s) that is/are (most) im-
portant for economic development are the specific institutions that constrain despotic state
power and provide security for private property rights.
6 The Time Series Evidence
Unlike the existing literature I also study the economic effect of private property rights
security and constraints on despotic state power over time. Time series analysis has obvious
advantages over cross-sectional designs because omitted variables are more likely to vary
between countries, as compared to within countries over time, and analysis over time enables
the use of lagged independent variables which are better able to deal with the problem of
reversed causality.25 Time series analysis is severely limited, however, by the absence of
reliable data on private property rights security from before 1995. Furthermore, the time
series of both constraints on the executive and private property rights security exhibits little
variation over time within countries. The estimation of time series models with country
fixed effects is for this reason unlikely to provide reliable estimates. I therefore employ two
alternative empirical strategies.
First, I see if private property rights security levels in 1995, 2000, and 2005 predict average
growth rates (G) over subsequent 5 and 10 year time periods. I do this by estimating the
24The results reported here are in line with the fact that AJR’s (2001) own IV estimates are in most
specifications more than twice as large as the OLS estimates. They defend this finding by referring to
attenuation bias because historic levels of constraints on despotic state power and historic levels of private
property rights security are important for current levels of income but are not perfectly correlated with
current measures of such institutions. Although this is (econometrically speaking) possible, it seems unlikely
that despotic state power and private property right institutions have varied so strongly in the past as to
double the effect (in fact, AJR (2001) provide empirical evidence for the contrary in the case of constraints
on the executive). If this would be the case, this would undermine AJR’s (2001) case for the instrument’s
validity, given that this depends on the claim that the institutions harming or securing private property
rights set up by colonists in the past persist until today.
25This is so although the potential effect of economic development on political institutions is likely to be
a slow-moving process which can only be captured by longer lags than the existing data allows.
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following equation using OLS:
Gi = β0 + β1M(t−1)i + β2ln(Y )(t−1)i + i (6)
With regard to constraints on despotic state power I see if levels of constraints on the
executive are associated with subsequent 10 year growth averages over the 1960 to 2010 time
period. I do this by estimating the following equation with OLS:
Gi = β0 + β1X(t−1)i + β2ln(Y )(t−1)i + i (7)
In both models I control for initial income levels (ln(Y )(t−1)) to take into account the possi-
bility that poorer countries have more “room” to grow (although growth rates and income
levels do not generally converge across countries), and to control for omitted variables that
vary across income levels.
Second, I use a most-likely case study design by analyzing changes in growth rates in
countries that have experienced an exceptionally large (and sustained) change in private
property rights security or constraints on the executive.26 My empirical approach in both
cases consists simply of comparing the average 10-year growth rate before and after an
exceptionally large and sustained change in the level of private property rights security and
constraints on the executive has taken place.
I define cases of exceptionally large and sustained changes in private property rights
security as instances where: (1) the level of private property rights security has been stable
for at least 3 years; (2) then the level of private property rights security changes at least 4
scale points (on a scale from 0 to 10) within 4 years.27 Note here that the standard deviation
of private property rights security is 2.40, which means that a change of 4 scale points in
26In these designs the researcher selects cases whereby the hypothesis that is being tested is most-likely
to hold. The logic is that if even in these cases one does not find affirmative evidence, the theory is unlikely
to hold in general. See Flyvbjerg (2006) on most-likely case study designs.
27This cut-off is selected because over this time period there are, by chance, no cases apparent that have
experienced a sustained change of 3 scale points in any direction.
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4 years is extraordinary large, so that if such a change is not followed by a clear change
in growth rates in the expected direction, one might legitimately wonder what change in
private property rights security would have a clear effect on economic growth; and (3) this
level of private property rights security is then maintained, or changes even further in the
same direction, for the rest of the observed period (until 2013).
I define cases of an exceptionally large and sustained change in constraints on despotic
state power as: (1) countries that have experienced a change in the level of constraints on
the executive of at least 4 scale points (on a scale from 1 to 7) within 4 years. Again, such a
change should, assuming that the effect of despotic state power on economic development is
large and causal, be followed by a clear change in growth rates in the expected direction; and
(2) this level is then maintained, or changes further in the same direction over the subsequent
10 years, so that the score on the constraints on the executive variable in each of the 10 years
after the change is always at least 4 scale points higher as the score in each of the individual
preceding 10 years.28
Table 5 reports the results of 5 and 10 year growth rates regressed on initial levels of
private property rights security and constraints on the executive, while controlling for initial
income levels. The results show that in all time periods since 1995 initial levels of private
property rights security are negatively associated with subsequent growth rates. This means
that countries with more secure private property rights have, at least over the time period
from 1995 to 2010, tended to grow slower than countries at similar income levels with initially
less secure private property rights. Similarly, countries with more constraint executives have
tended to grow slower in the majority of decades since 1960. Only in the two decades from
1980 to 2000 have countries in the categories 3 to 7 of Polity IV’s original constraints on the
executive variable grown faster than those countries with the least constraint executives in
categories 1 and 2.
28I allow for the constraints on the executive variable to not be fully stable before the significant change
occurs because, unlikely the short time series data available for private property rights security, I have in all
cases enough data to observe the volatility over the whole 20-year time period.
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Table 5: Income growth regressed on the initial level of private property rights security and
the initial level of constraints on the executive (see time period in column headings).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: 1996-2005 2001-2010 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2010
Property rights (t-1) -0.252 -0.821** -0.106 -0.915 -0.658*
(0.311) (0.307) (0.426) (0.557) (0.293)
Log GDP per capita (t-1) 0.138 -0.122 0.435 0.304 -0.497
(0.335) (0.264) (0.454) (0.455) (0.364)
Constant 2.402*** 2.795*** 2.071*** 3.082*** 2.388***
(0.234) (0.221) (0.285) (0.322) (0.194)
Observations 94 152 94 152 149
Adjusted R-squared -0.015 0.113 0.002 0.035 0.140
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2010
Constraints on executive = 3-4 (t-1) -0.848 -0.121 1.904** 0.530 -0.932
(0.919) (0.764) (0.684) (0.953) (0.956)
Constraints on executive = 5-6 (t-1) -0.283 -0.265 2.083* 1.118 -0.518
(1.032) (1.340) (0.874) (0.908) (0.805)
Constraints on executive = 7 (t-1) 0.849 -0.350 2.900*** 1.310* -0.505
(0.951) (1.103) (0.777) (0.726) (0.783)
Log GDP per capita (t-1) -0.115 0.056 -0.524 -0.096 -0.526
(0.312) (0.605) (0.331) (0.312) (0.285)
Constant 3.130*** 2.426*** -0.834 0.869 3.042***
(0.776) (0.670) (0.491) (0.717) (0.722)
Observations 57 106 117 119 146
Adjusted R-squared 0.024 -0.038 0.123 -0.009 0.024
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent
variable in all regressions is GDP per capita growth. Data from before 1990 is real GDP per capita
growth, measured in constant 2005 US dollars (from the Penn World Tables). Data from after 1990
is GDP per capita PPP growth, calculated from constant 2011 international dollars (from the World
Bank’s World Development Indicators). Property rights (t-1) is private property rights security levels
(standardized) as measured by the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, in the previous year
(higher scores mean more secure private property rights). Constraints on executive (t-1) is constraints
on the executive as measured by Polity IV, in the previous year (higher scores mean more constraints
on the executive). Reference category is category 1 and 2 of the original constraints on the executive
variable. Log GDP per capita (t-1) is the level of real GDP per capita or GDP per capita PPP, in the
previous year.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 6 reports the results with regard to the effect on economic growth of an exception-
ally large and sustained change in private property rights security. In total three countries
since 1995 have seen an exceptionally large and sustained positive change in private property
rights security of 4 scale points within 4 years. These are: Barbados (1998-2001), Cyprus
(1999-2001), and Malta (1998-2001). Of these three countries only Barbados has experienced
a change in growth rates in the expected direction (the growth rate in the period 2002-2012
was 0.45% higher as compared to the period 1987-1997). Cyprus and Malta have, contrary
to the hypothesis, both experienced a large decrease in growth rates after a significant in-
crease in private property rights security (in both cases the growth rate in the decade after
the significant and sustained change towards more secure private property rights was more
that 2% lower as compared to the preceding decade).
Six countries have experienced an exceptionally large and sustained decrease in private
property rights security since 1995. These are: Kuwait (2002-2004), Saudi Arabia (1999-
2000), Pakistan (1998-1999), Namibia (2005), Philippines (2001-2004), and Argentina (2001-
2003). Only Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have seen a change in their growth rates in the
expected direction (both of which are decreases in growth rates of less than 0.50%). Pakistan,
Namibia, Philippines, and Argentina have, contrary to the private property rights security
hypothesis, experienced a substantial increase in growth rates after their level of private
property rights security deteriorated significantly.29
Table 7 reports the results with regard to the effect on economic growth of an exception-
ally large and sustained change in constraints on the executive. Twenty-one countries have
experienced a sustained increase in constraints on the executive of 4 scale points in 4 years
since 1960. Of the twenty of these for which the Penn World Tables provides GDP per capita
data, twelve, a little bit more than half, have experienced a subsequent increase in growth
29All these results are substantively the same in all cases when excluding the years after 2007 (i.e. ex-
cluding the global economic crises years). Only in the case of Kuwait the difference in growth rates changes
signs. The average economic growth rate from 2004 to 2007 in Kuwait was 3.83%, almost 5% higher than
the economic growth rate in the decade before Kuwait’s level of private property rights security deteriorated
significantly between 2002 and 2004. Excluding the crisis years thus provides further evidence against the
private property rights security hypothesis.
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Table 6: Effect on 10-year growth rate of exceptionally large and sustained changes in private
property rights security.
Country ∆ in X (year) Growth (pre) Growth (post) ∆ in growth
Barbados +2 (1998); +2 (2001) 0.61 1.06 0.45
Cyprus* +2 (1999); +2 (2001) 3.35 0.89 -2.46
Malta† +2 (1998); +2 (2001) 4.66 1.42 -3.24
Kuwait -2 (2002); -2 (2004) -1.56 -2.05 -0.49
Saudi Arabia -2 (1999); -2 (2000) 0.93 0.55 -0.38
Pakistan -2 (1998); -2 (1999) 1.86 2.55 0.70
Namibia -4 (2005) 1.76 2.85 1.09
Philippines -2 (2001); -2 (2004) 0.55 3.49 2.94
Argentina -2 (2001); -2 (2003) 2.39 6.44 4.05
Notes: Growth is 10-year GDP per capita growth. Data for changes in private property rights security
from before 2000 is real GDP per capita growth, measured in constant 2005 US dollars (from the Penn
World Tables). The last year included in the estimation of average ex post growth rates for changes in
private property rights security that occurred before 2000 is 2011. Data for changes in private property
rights security from after 2000 is GDP per capita PPP growth, calculated from constant 2011 interna-
tional dollars (from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators). The last year included in the
post growth rates for changes in private property rights security that occurred after 2000 is 2013. Prop-
erty rights is private property rights security levels as measured by the Heritage Foundation Index of
Economic Freedom (measured from 0 to 10, higher scores mean more secure private property rights).
Cases are selected if: (1) private property rights security is stable for at least 3 years; (2) then private
property rights security changes in one direction, with at least 4 scale points, within 4 years; and (3)
this level is then sustained, or private property rights changes further in the same direction for the rest
of the observed period (until 2013).
* The level of private property rights security is not fully sustained in Cyprus for the rest of the time
period. 9 years after the change in private property rights security from 5 to 9 occurred between 1999 and
2001, the level of private property rights security in Cyprus decreased from 9 to 8 in 2010 and decreased
further from 8 to 7 in 2012.
†Private property rights security data for Malta in 1995 is missing. Therefore I observe in the case
of Malta only if the level of private property rights security is stable in the two years preceding the
significant change in private property rights security levels which started in 1998.
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rates (a change in line with the constraints on despotic state power hypothesis). Contrary
to the hypothesis, however, eight countries have experienced a decrease in economic growth
rates after they experienced an exceptionally large and sustained increase in constraints on
the executive (in all of these cases the growth rate decreased with more than 1% after the
introduction of significantly more constraints on the executive).
Exceptionally large and sustained deteriorations in constraints on despotic state power
have been much less common over the last 50 years. Only four countries since 1960 have
experienced a sustained decrease of 4 scale points in 4 years, none of which occurred after
1980. For two of these cases, Guyana (1978-1980) and Myanmar/Burma (1962), the Penn
World Tables does not provide GDP data. Of the remaining two cases one is in line with the
constraints on despotic state power hypothesis and one is evidence against it. Panama has
grown 0.03% slower in the 10 years after 1968, when its constraints on the executive score
decreased with 4 scale points in one year. In Brazil, in contrast, the significant decline in
constraints on the executive in the first half of the 1960s was followed by a decade of 2.22%
higher economic growth (as compared to the average growth rate from 1950-1960).
In sum, the time series evidence suggests: (1) that higher levels and/or exceptionally
large and sustained increases in private property rights security are generally associated
with lower economic growth rates; and (2) that higher levels and/or exceptionally large and
sustained increases in constraints on the executive are not clearly associated with higher, or
lower, economic growth rates.
The time series evidence also provides little support for the claim that changes in private
property rights security are caused by changes in institutional constraints on despotic state
power; none of the cases of exceptionally large and sustained changes in private property
rights security reported in table 6 are preceded, or coincide, with exceptionally large and
sustained changes in constraints on the executive, as reported in table 7.
35
Table 7: Effect on 10-year growth rate of exceptionally large and sustained changes in
constraints on the executive.
Country ∆ in X (year) Pre-growth Post-growth ∆ in growth
Albania +2 (1990); +2 (1992) 0.53 7.00 6.47
Nigeria +4 (1999) 1.06 5.75 4.69
Chile +5 (1989) 1.95 4.38 2.44
Uruguay +4 (1985) 0.89 3.29 2.39
Brazil +3 (1985); +1 (1988) 1.89 0.19 2.22
Cent. Afr. Rep. +4 (1993) -1.88 0.34 2.21
Philippines +5 (1987) -0.38 0.94 1.32
Argentina +6 (1983) -0.42 0.86 1.29
Benin +4 (1991) 0.96 1.84 0.88
Mali +4 (1992) 1.44 2.06 0.62
Hungary +4 (1990) 1.72 2.11 0.40
Zambia +4 (1991) -1.58 -1.22 0.36
Mongolia +2 (1990); +2 (1992) 3.26 2.16 -1.11
Spain +6 (1978) 3.89 2.03 -1.87
Bolivia +6 (1982) 1.20 -0.77 -1.96
Portugal +5 (1976) 5.03 2.41 -2.62
Paraguay +2 (1989); +4 (1992) 2.07 -0.62 -2.70
Thailand +4 (1992) 5.83 2.93 -2.90
Bulgaria +4 (1990) 4.07 0.21 -3.86
Peru +5 (1980) 1.08 -3.06 -4.14
Guyana +4 (1992) N/A N/A N/A
Panama -4 (1968) 3.48 3.45 -0.03
Brazil -1 (1961); -1 (1963); -2 (1965) 3.78 6.00 2.22
Guyana -1 (1978); -4 (1980) N/A N/A N/A
Myanmar -6 (1962) N/A N/A N/A
Notes: Growth is 10-year GDP per capita growth. Data is real GDP per capita growth, measured in
constant 2005 US dollars (from the Penn World Tables). Constraints on the executive as measured by
Polity IV (measured from 1 to 7, higher scores mean more constraints on the executive). Cases are
selected if a country has experienced a change in constraints on the executive whereby in each of the 10
consecutive years Polity IV’s constraints on the executive score is 4 points higher as compared to each
individual year in the 10 years preceding it. N/A indicates that GDP data is not available.
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7 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has reassessed the evidence for the claim, underlying much of modern growth
theory, that private property rights security is central to explaining cross-country differ-
ences in economic development and that differences in private property rights security are
in turn caused by differences in the extent to which a country’s political system is able to
institutionally constrain the despotic power of its state executive.
I conclude that the existing literature with regard to the causes and effects of private
property rights security claims substantially more than the underlying evidence can sustain.
First, the Korean “natural experiment”, which is regularly cited as evidence in favor of the
importance for economic development of the type of institutions that constrain despotic state
power and secure private property rights, is in fact important evidence against these claims.
The South Korean government was highly unconstraint and despotic throughout South Ko-
rea’s period of most rapid economic growth (1963-1987). During this period private property
rights in virtually all major industries, most of which still provide the backbone of South
Korea’s economy today, were openly and frequently violated. When South Korea did de-
velop institutions that substantially constraint the despotic power of its state executive, it
did so in 1988, well after it already achieved average GDP per capita PPP growth rates of
about 7% per year over the preceding 25-year period. Second, the main prediction of the
private property rights security hypothesis – that countries that have more secure private
property rights are on average richer than countries with less secure private property rights
– only holds within the group of countries that have already attained a high level of income.
Third, Polity IV’s “constraints on the executive” variable, the literature’s indicator of choice
for measuring constraints on despotic state power, is when used on its proper, ordinal, mea-
surement level not correlated with levels of income and/or private property rights security.
Fourth, AJR’s (2001) European settler mortality instrument is likely to be invalid since it
remains strongly correlated with GDP per capita PPP after controlling for private property
rights security and constraints on the executive. Fifth, levels of constraints on the executive
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and private property rights security are not correlated with subsequent growth rates. Last,
exceptionally large and sustained changes in the level of constraints on the executive and
private property rights security are not correlated with subsequent changes in growth rates.
Future research will have to establish why, at closer assessment, the type of institutions
that constrain despotic state power and secure private property rights have little to no effect
on economic development. Due to space limitations, I here discuss only two possibilities that
I ought of greatest importance.
With regard to private property rights security it seems highly likely that a complete ab-
sence of private property rights security will strongly disincentive productive behavior. But
while it seems reasonable to argue that complete and persistent uncertainty about the secu-
rity of private property rights is harmful for long-term investment and growth, it is not likely
that securing private property rights as strongly as possible has uniformly positive effects
in all countries, at all times, and on all levels of development (Chang, 2011). While secure
private property rights might cause better development outcomes under some conditions, in
other cases they might actually serve vested interests and thus hamper technological change,
social mobility, and ultimately economic growth. This might be especially the case in many
of today’s poor countries where power and wealth are distributed very unequally. On the
theoretical level, Coase (1960) has shown that the initial distribution of property rights does
have an effect on allocative efficiency if one assumes transaction costs to exist, which is
necessary for institutions to be relevant (North, 1990). This is even the case when property
rights are well-defined defined and perfectively enforced, and when assuming conditions of
full market competition. This is because in a world with transaction costs not all socially
optimal transactions (i.e. those exchanges that reallocate resources to agents who can use
them more productively as compared to their initial owners) will occur due to the additional
cost of transacting that is unrelated to the value of the good/asset itself.
Other important questions with regard to the private property rights security hypothesis
are to what extent private property rights violations happen “often enough” and whether
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investors react “strongly enough” to explain the large differences in income that we observe
across countries today. Li (2009), Kobrin (1984) and Hajzler (2012) find that nationalizations
and state expropriations of private property occur very rarely, and if they occur, typically
occur only in a small set of countries in which they affect only a limited number of (generally
foreign-owned) firms in specific sectors (mainly petroleum and mining).30 Even in these cases
investment is not reduced observably (Hajzler, 2012).31
With regard to the relationship between constraints on despotic state power and economic
development future research would benefit of taking the possibility of reversed causality
particularly seriously. Based on Polity IV’s constraints on the executive time series data
one can say that: (1) in all cases of development success in the 19th century (Western
Europe, the United States, Canada, New Zealand), with the exception of England and
the United States (and possibly Canada and New Zealand for which data is lacking from
before 1850), substantial constraints on the executive (as indicated by category 6 or 7) were
institutionalized at the end of the 19th or beginning of the 20th century, after the Industrial
Revolution had taken place in these countries32; and (2) in all cases of development success
30Focusing on the period from 1960 to 1976, when state expropriations were most common, Kobrin (1984)
finds that less than 5 percent of all foreign-owned firms in developing countries experienced expropriation.
That figure is likely to be substantially lower in recent decades. Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin (2011), for
example, study all cases of expropriation in the oil sector from 1960 to 2006 and find only 5 cases of
government expropriation since 1981. Hajzler (2012) finds only 49 cases of (general) state expropriations
from 1990 to 2006, 27 of which occurred in just 9 countries.
31There are also many significant historic and contemporary cases of extreme development success in
contexts of significant private property rights violations. In the United States between 1870 and 1910
expropriation was commonly used as a public policy instrument to stimulate railroad construction, milling,
and mining (Scheiber, 1973). During this period the North-American economy grew at its fastest rate in
history, with real wages, wealth, GDP, and capital formation all increasing rapidly (Kennedy, 2010). In
China, the biggest development success of today, land is not privatized and large-scale expropriation of
private property happen on a regular basis (Whyte, 2009; Li, 2004). Rithmire (2017) finds that the Chinese
Communist party has in recent years strengthened, rather than weakened, the institutions that permit land
expropriations.
32Even for England and the United States one can, based on historical accounts, doubt if effective con-
straints on despotic state power and private property rights security were institutionalized before the English
(1760-1840) and American (1820-1870) Industrial Revolution. Far into the 19th and regularly 20th century
both England and the United States struggled with widespread corruption and despotic application of state
power; public offices in the judiciary and bureaucracy were sold to the highest bidder, the justice system
heavily favored political- and economic elites, and the law was openly applied unequally according to class,
gender, and race. Expropriation by the state or powerful private actors was common (see footnote 32).
Furthermore, the selection of executives in both the United States and England was throughout the 19th
century limited to (a small number of) property-owning white males. The political system did therefore not
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in the 20th century, with the possible exception of Japan, substantial constraints on the
executive also came after economic development (Korea, Taiwan) or did not institutionalize
at all (China, Russia, Singapore, Hong Kong).
These results have large implications for current development practice and research. The
vast majority of current growth theory assumes that the fundamental challenge for today’s
developing countries is to more effectively tie the hands of the Leviathan, so to avoid the
state executive branch from retarding the allocation of resources brought forward by private
agents through the market mechanism. Accordingly, the focus in much of contemporary de-
velopment economics is on how to increase private property rights security in the developing
world. The results reported in this paper question this theoretical focus and suggest that
future research would benefit from also including more systematically other dimensions of
(state) institutions and policies, some of which might be related to the violation of the indi-
vidual right to fully autonomously allocate scarce resources, such as the provision of public
goods and the implementation of industrial policy. On the policy side many countries have
democratized and have managed to introduce substantially more constraints on their exec-
utive from the 1980s onwards. Although this is clearly an important human achievement,
this has not led to higher economic growth rates. In fact, economic growth rates around
the world, as well as in the developing world, were substantially higher in the period with
“bad” institutions from 1950 to 1980, as compared to the period with substantially “better”
institutions, from the 1980s onwards (Chang, 2014; Ben-David and Papell, 1998).33 With-
out denying the importance of expanding individual political rights vis-a`-vis despotic state
power for the achievement of other human ends, developing countries will have to focus on
introducing other types of institutions and policies to increase their economic growth rates.
hold the executive branch accountable to the interest of most of the population (Chang, 2002).
33GDP per capita growth was approximately 3% between 1950 and 1973, double the rate achieved since
the late 1970s (Rodrik, 2011). This is true even when including China, which substantially increases the
average growth rate in the period after 1980 while China has institutions that do not provide much security
to private property rights and put little constraints on the despotic power of the Chinese Communist Party.
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Appendix A. Political history South Korea (1961-1997).
South Korea’s main leader throughout its period of rapid industrialization, general Park
Chung-Hee, came to power by means of a military coup in 1961 and was voted president
in 1963 and 1967. In 1969 his government forced a constitutional amendment through the
National Assembly allowing him to get re-elected for a third presidential term in 1971. The
constitutional change and election lead to widespread demonstrations and protests which
caused the Park government to declare a state of emergency and eventually, in 1972, to
implement a martial law which suspended the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly,
and prohibited all political parties and other political activities (see drop from 3 to 1 in
figure 1). In November 1972 the Yushin constitution came into power which effectively gave
general Park full control over parliament and the possibility of permanent presidency. The
president would be elected only indirectly by a National Council for Unification that the
president himself headed and of which one-third of the members where directly appointed
by the president (the rest being appointed by a structurally rigged election mechanism). This
electoral committee in turn elected the members of parliament on the recommendation of the
president. All judges were appointed by the president directly, and educational guidelines
were under direct government surveillance.
Large protests and political turmoil remained throughout the country which lead to
emergency decrees in 1974 and 1975, widespread state violence towards political opposition
groups, the jailing of hundreds of dissidents, and finally, in 1979, the murder of general
Park himself by Kim Jae-Gyu (the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency). After
several months of political instability and rapid transfers of government power, general Chun
Doo-Hwan came to power through a coup d’e´tat in 1979 and was subsequently (indirectly)
elected as president in 1980. Chun established a new constitution with some notable changes;
maintaining the presidential system but limiting it to a single 7-year term, strengthening the
authority of the National Assembly, and conferring the responsibilities of appointing the
judiciary to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, rather than the president (see increase
from 1 to 3 in figure 1). However, Chun’s military regime clearly ruled with fundamentally
the same constitutional vision and leadership style as Park had done. The system of indirect
election of the president stayed and many military persons were appointed to highly ranked
government positions.
Chun’s regime finally collapsed under popular revolt in 1987. A revised Constitution
was approved by means of a referendum on 28 October 1987 and the first direct presidential
election in 16 years took place on 16 December of that year. This election led to Roh Tae-Woo
becoming president, who subsequently set out to eliminate past vestiges of authoritarian rule
by revising laws and decrees to fit democratic provisions. The move to democracy was further
confirmed by the legislative election of 26 April 1988. Freedom of the press was expanded
(although still limited) and university autonomy was recognized (see increase from 3 to 6 in
figure 1). In December 1996, in a response to popular demand, former president Chun was
indicted on charges linked to bribery, illegal funds, and responsibility for the 1980 Gwangju
massacre, and was sentenced to prison. In 1997, the opposition leader Kim Dae-jung won
the presidential elections; the first time an opposition candidate won the South Korean
presidential elections and the first time government power was transferred by peaceful means
(35 years after South Korea’s rapid economic development started in 1963).
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Appendix B. Descriptive statistics.
Table 8: Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max N
Log GDP per capita PPP 9.135 1.207 6.350 11.801 180
Property rights 4.29 2.412 0.5 9.5 176
Constraints on executive (1-7) 5.201 1.938 1 7 159
Constraints on executive = 1-2 0.132 0.34 0 1 159
Constraints on executive = 3-4 0.176 0.382 0 1 159
Constraints on executive = 5-6 0.302 0.461 0 1 159
Constraints on executive = 7 0.39 0.489 0 1 159
Log European settler mortality 4.596 1.303 0.936 7.986 87
Equality of opportunity 5.152 1.947 1 9 125
Low income 0.156 0.364 0 1 186
Middle income 0.559 0.498 0 1 186
High income 0.285 0.453 0 1 186
Log real GDP per capita 8.925 1.212 5.901 11.72 164
Constraints on government 5.7 1.685 2.371 9.275 96
Democracy 6.8 3.045 0 10 192
Government expropriation 5.827 1.591 1.7 9.4 97
Property rights (BTI) 6.24 2.09 1.5 10 125
Contract viability/expropriation 5.4 1.335 2 8 140
Notes: All (interval/ratio) variables are standardized using Z-scores in the models.
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Appendix C. Results Penn World Table GDP data.
Table 9: Real GDP per capita (Penn World Tables) regressed on private property rights
security.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Property rights 0.848*** -0.088 0.149 0.276**
(0.065) (0.413) (0.110) (0.087)
Constant 9.003*** 6.988*** 8.788*** 9.962***
(0.068) (0.301) (0.083) (0.125)
Observations 158 25 85 48
Adjusted R-squared 0.462 -0.038 0.004 0.141
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is real GDP per capita in 2011,
measured in constant 2005 US dollars (from the Penn World Tables). Property rights is private property
rights security as measured by the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. Income group
classifications are based on the 2017 World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 10: Real GDP per capita (Penn World Tables) regressed on constraints on the execu-
tive.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: Full Full Low income Middle income High income
Constraints on executive (1-7) 0.383**
(0.131)
Constraints on executive = 3-4 -0.730* -0.459** -0.140 0.352
(0.322) (0.148) (0.245) (0.349)
Constraints on executive = 5-6 -0.909** -0.754*** -0.260 -0.333
(0.306) (0.141) (0.264) (0.332)
Constraints on executive = 7 0.598* -0.518*** -0.009 -0.443
(0.271) (0.006) (0.243) (0.340)
Constant 8.658*** 9.031*** 7.631*** 8.790*** 10.636***
(0.134) (0.243) (0.006) (0.202) (0.332)
Observations 148 148 25 79 44
Adjusted R-squared 0.056 0.274 0.106 -0.015 0.126
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent
variable in all regressions is real GDP per capita (PPP basis) in 2011, measured in constant 2005 US
dollars (from the Penn World Tables). Constraints on the executive as measured by Polity IV. Constraints
on the executive (1-7) is standardized. Reference category in column (2) (5) are categories 1 and 2 of
the original constraints on the executive variable. Income group classifications are based on the 2017
World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Appendix D. Results alternative measures of private
property rights security.
Table 11: Income levels regressed on government expropriation without adequate compen-
sation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Government expropriation 0.659*** 0.121 0.225 0.142
(0.084) (0.121) (0.116) (0.114)
Constant 9.391*** 7.397*** 9.205*** 10.348***
(0.090) (0.119) (0.088) (0.130)
Observations 95 11 54 30
Adjusted R-squared 0.329 -0.013 0.052 0.031
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is log GDP per capita (PPP basis)
in 2013, measured in constant 2011 international dollars (from the World Banks World Development
Indicators). Government expropriation without adequate compensation comes from the World Justice
Project. Income group classifications are based on the 2017 World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 12: Income levels regressed on private property rights security (Bertelmann Transfor-
mation Index).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Property Rights 0.665*** 0.258 0.165 -0.525***
(0.100) (0.174) (0.095) (0.110)
Constant 8.891*** 7.379*** 9.063*** 11.097***
(0.090) (0.119) (0.071) (0.189)
Observations 118 24 75 19
Adjusted R-squared 0.299 0.082 0.034 0.275
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are re-
ported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is log GDP per capita (PPP basis) in
2013, measured in constant 2011 international dollars (from the World Banks World Development Indica-
tors). Property rights is private property rights security as measured by the Bertelmann Transformation
Index. Income group classifications are based on the 2017 World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 13: Income levels regressed on contract viability and risk of expropriation.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Contract viability/expropriation 0.801*** 0.080 0.095 0.217***
(0.099) (0.180) (0.100) (0.057)
Constant 9.642*** 7.280*** 9.199*** 10.471***
(0.077) (0.215) (0.090) (0.055)
Observations 131 19 64 48
Adjusted R-squared 0.321 -0.045 -0.004 0.156
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is log GDP per capita (PPP basis)
in 2013, measured in constant 2011 international dollars (from the World Banks World Development
Indicators). Contract viability/expropriation as measured by the Interna- tional Country Risk Guide
(Political Risk Services). Income group classifications are based on the 2017 World Bank income group
categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Appendix E. Coding of Polity IV’s constraints on the
executive variable.
(1) Unlimited Authority: There are no regular limitations on the executive’s actions (as
distinct from irregular limitations such as the threat or actuality of coups and assassinations).
Examples of evidence:
• Constitutional restrictions on executive action are ignored.
• Constitution is frequently revised or suspended at the executive’s initiative.
• There is no legislative assembly, or there is one but it is called and dismissed at the
executive’s pleasure.
• The executive appoints a majority of members of any accountability group and can
remove them at will.
• The legislature cannot initiate legislation or veto or suspend acts of the executive.
• Rule by decree is repeatedly used.
(2) Intermediate Category
(3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority: There are some real but
limited restraints on the executive. Evidence:
• The legislature initiates some categories of legislation.
• The legislature blocks implementation of executive acts and decrees.
• Attempts by the executive to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibi-
tions on succeeding himself, or extending his term, fail and are not adopted.
• The ruling party initiates some legislation or takes some administrative action inde-
pendently of the executive.
• The legislature or party approves some categories of appointments nominated by the
executive.
• There is an independent judiciary.
• Situations in which there exists a civilian executive, but in which policy decisions, for
all practical purposes, reflect the demands of the military.
(4) Intermediate Category
(5) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority: The executive has more effective
authority than any accountability group but is subject to substantial constraints by them.
Examples:
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• A legislature or party council often modifies or defeats executive proposals for action.
• A council or legislature sometimes refuses funds to the executive.
• The accountability group makes important appointments to administrative posts.
• The legislature refuses the executive permission to leave the country.
(6) Intermediate Category
(7) Executive Parity or Subordination: Accountability groups have effective authority
equal to or greater than the executive in most areas of activity. Examples of evidence:
• A legislature, ruling party, or council of nobles initiates much or most important leg-
islation.
• The executive (president, premier, king, cabinet, council) is chosen by the accountabil-
ity group and is dependent on its continued support to remain in office (as in most
parliamentary systems).
• In multi-party democracies, there is chronic “cabinet instability.”
Source: Marshall, M.G., T.R. Gurr and K. Jaggers. 2016. Dataset users manual: Political
regime characteristics and transitions. Centre for Systematic Peace (pp. 24-25).
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Appendix F. Effect of alternative measures of institu-
tions constraining despotic state power.
Table 14: Income levels regressed on constraints on government.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Constraints on government 0.686*** 0.074 0.164 0.228
(0.077) (0.160) (0.140) (0.131)
Constant 9.316*** 7.373*** 9.169*** 10.199***
(0.086) (0.197) (0.090) (0.193)
Observations 95 11 54 30
Adjusted R-squared 0.408 -0.096 0.014 0.117
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is log GDP per capita (PPP basis)
in 2013, measured in constant 2011 international dollars (from the World Banks World Development
Indicators). Constraints on government as measured by the World Justice Project. Income group
classifications are based on the 2017 World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 15: Security of private property rights regressed on constraints on government.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Constraints on government 0.918*** 0.279 0.594*** 0.916***
(0.040) (0.260) (0.080) (0.123)
Constant -0.056 -0.601* -0.305*** 0.143
(0.048) (0.233) (0.074) (0.188)
Observations 96 11 55 30
Adjusted R-squared 0.801 0.042 0.496 0.640
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is private property rights security
as measured by the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. Constraints on government as
measured by the World Justice Project. Income group classifications are based on the 2017 World Bank
income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Table 16: Income levels regressed on (liberal) democracy.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Democracy 0.384** 0.036 -0.079 -0.252***
(0.116) (0.139) (0.087) (0.069)
Constant 9.014*** 7.224*** 8.990*** 10.685***
(0.106) (0.079) (0.073) (0.081)
Observations 180 28 100 52
Adjusted R-squared 0.071 -0.035 -0.002 0.229
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is log GDP per capita (PPP basis)
in 2013, measured in constant 2011 international dollars (from the World Banks World Development
Indicators). Liberal democracy as measured by Polity IV/Freedom House. Income group classifications
are based on the 2017 World Bank income group categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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Table 17: Security of private property rights regressed on (liberal) democracy.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample: Full Low income Middle income High income
Democracy 0.694*** 0.298* 0.415*** 0.378***
(0.073) (0.113) (0.067) (0.081)
Constant -0.401*** -0.859*** -0.690*** 0.715***
(0.062) (0.073) (0.054) (0.107)
Observations 176 27 99 50
Adjusted R-squared 0.363 0.196 0.269 0.189
Notes: All regressions are OLS. Coefficients reported are standardized. Robust standard errors are
reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in all regressions is private property rights security as
measured by the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom. Liberal democracy as measured by
Polity IV/Freedom House. Income group classifications are based on the 2017 World Bank income group
categorization.
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
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